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In a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocol, which is based on hetero-
dyne detection at the receiver, the application of a noiseless linear amplifier (NLA) on the received
signal before the detection can be emulated by the post-selection of the detection outcome. Such
a post-selection, which is also called a measurement-based NLA, requires a cut-off to produce a
normalisable filter function. Increasing the cut-off with respect to the received signals results in a
more faithful emulation of the NLA and nearly Gaussian output statistics at the cost of discarding
more data. While recent works have shown the benefits of post-selection via an asymptotic security
analysis, we undertake the first investigation of such a post-selection utilising a composable security
proof in the realistic finite-size regime, where this trade-off is extremely relevant. We show that this
form of post-selection can improve the secure range of a CV-QKD over lossy thermal channels if the
finite block size is sufficiently large and that the optimal value for the filter cut-off is typically in
the non-Gaussian regime. The relatively modest improvement in the finite-size regime as compared
to the asymptotic case highlights the need for new tools to prove the security of non-Gaussian cryp-
tographic protocols. These results also represent a quantitative assessment of a measurement-based
NLA with an entangled-state input in both the Gaussian and non-Gaussian regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] is the most
mature application of quantum information technologies,
which allows two distant trusted parties, traditionally
called Alice and Bob, to share a secret key which is un-
known to a potential eavesdropper, Eve. In the quan-
tum communication part of QKD Alice encodes classical
information (i.e., key information) into conjugate quan-
tum basis states, which are then transmitted over an in-
secure quantum channel to Bob, who measures the re-
ceived quantum states in a randomly-chosen basis, to
obtain classical information which is correlated to Al-
ice’s data. Repeating this procedure many times, Alice
and Bob end up with two sets of correlated data, known
as the raw keys. In the classical post-processing part of
QKD Alice and Bob proceed with the sifting (if applica-
ble), parameter estimation, reconciliation (or error cor-
rection), and privacy amplification over a public but au-
thenticated classical channel to obtain a shared secret key
[1–3]. QKD systems were first introduced using discrete-
variable quantum systems, where the key information is
encoded onto the degrees of freedom of single photons,
and the measurement at the receiver is realized by single-
photon detectors [4, 5]. As an alternative, continuous-
variable (CV) QKD systems were introduced [6–8], where
the key information is encoded onto the amplitude and
phase quadratures of the quantized electromagnetic field,
and the measurement relies on coherent detection, ei-
ther homodyne or heterodyne detectors [9–11], which are
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faster and more efficient than single-photon detectors.
CV-QKD systems can potentially achieve higher secret
key rates than their discrete-variable counterparts, and
their practical implementation is also compatible with
current telecommunication optical networks. Although,
thanks to the reverse reconciliation [12] (where the re-
ceiver, i.e., Bob, is the reference of the error correction),
a secret key can asymptotically be generated for a pure
loss channel over an arbitrary large distance, the practi-
cal secure distance of CV-QKD systems is limited due to
the excess noise, imperfect classical post-processing, and
finite-size effects.
In order to improve the transmission range of CV-QKD
systems a post-selection strategy was proposed [13–17],
in which, following the measurement of all the received
quantum states, Alice and Bob discard the classical data
corresponding to those channels for which the resulting
key rate is negative, keeping only the data correspond-
ing to those channels with a positive key-rate contribu-
tion. In this technique the resulting post-selected data
has non-Gaussian statistics. Further, it has been shown
that the application of a noiseless linear amplifier (NLA),
proposed in [18], on the received signal preceding the
detction can probabilistically enhance the secure range of
CV-QKD systems, while preserving the Gaussian statis-
tics [19]. However, any physical realization of the NLA
is very demanding, requiring state-of-the art technology,
such as single-photon sources, single-photon addition and
subtraction. Moreover, the actual success probability of
these experiments is much lower than the theoretical pre-
dictions. In [20–22] it has been shown that the physical
implementation of the NLA can be substituted with a
classical data post-processing. In particular, where the
NLA directly precedes a heterodyne detection, the noise-
2less amplifier can be emulated by a Gaussian post-selectin
of the detection outcome via a probabilistic classical fil-
ter function [21, 22]. This post-selection scheme, which is
also called measurement-based NLA [22], has experimen-
tally been demonstrated in [22] and requires a cut-off on
the classical filter to emulate the NLA. The post-selection
scheme results in Gaussian statistics for the post-selected
data if the filter cut-off is chosen sufficiently large [21, 22].
In the asymptotic regime it has been shown that the
Gaussian post-selection can extend the maximum trans-
mission distance of CV-QKD systems [20–22]. However,
in reality a finite number of signals are exchanged be-
tween Alice and Bob. The finite-size issue becomes even
more significant when the post-selection is applied as it
reduces the size of data. It is unclear whether the post-
selection can still improve the CV-QKD performance in
the realistic finite-size regime.
In this work we investigate the finite-size effects in
the security analysis of CV-QKD systems with the post-
selection (or the measurement-based NLA) at the re-
ceiver. We show that in the finite-size regime when the
filter cut-off is large enough to make the post-selected
statistics Gaussian, the maximum transmission distance
of the CV-QKD system can be improved providing that
the block size is sufficiently large. Considering finite
blocks in a practical regime, we illustrate that the post-
selection is effective when the CV-QKD system has un-
dergone high values of excess noise. Since reducing the
cut-off can increase the success probability of the post-
selection (at the expense of decreasing the classical mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob), we also in-
vestigate the impact reducing the cut-off can have on
the finite-size key rate, illustrating that if the filter cut-
off is sufficiently reduced, the improvement of CV-QKD
performance due to the post-selection can further be in-
creased. Note that in the recent works on measurement-
based NLA [21, 22], the security proof is based on the
equivalent entanglement-based scheme where the classi-
cal filter is replaced with a quantum filter (or NLA), as
they assumed a sufficiently large cut-off to emulate an
ideal NLA (with a Gaussian output). However, since
reducing the cut-off can change the statistics of the post-
selected data from Gaussian to non-Gaussian regime,
we analyse the security proof based on the equivalent
entanglement-based scheme with a classical filter (and
not a quantum filter). Thus, our results also provides a
characterization of the measurement-based NLA, when it
is applied to a mixed Gaussian entangled state, which is
an extension to a recent work on the characterization of
the measurement-based NLA with a pure coherent-state
input [23].
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as fol-
lows. In Sec. II, the Gaussian CV-QKD system is de-
scribed. In Sec. III, the security of the CV-QKD system
is analysed in both the asymptotic and finite-size regime.
In Sec. IV, the post-selection of Bob’s detection outcome
is discussed, and the security of the post-selection proto-
col is analysed. In Sec. V, the numerical results, showing
the impact of the post-selection on the CV-QKD per-
formance in the finite-size regime, is provided. Finally,
concluding remarks are provided in Sec. VI.
II. CV-QKD SYSTEM
Here we consider a Gaussian no-switching CV-QKD
protocol [15, 24], that relies on the preparation of coher-
ent states and heterodyne detection . In a prepare-and-
measure scheme Alice generates a pair of random real
numbers, aq and ap, chosen from two independent Gaus-
sian distributions of variance VA. Alice prepares coherent
states by modulating (displacing) a coherent laser source
by amounts of aq and ap, such that the variance of the
imposed signals is VA. The variance of the beam after the
modulator is VA+1 = V (where the 1 is for the shot noise
variance), hence we obtain an average output state which
is thermal of variance V . The prepared coherent states
are then transmitted over an insecure quantum channel
with transmissivity T and excess noise ξ (relative to the
input of the quantum channel) to Bob. For each incoming
state, Bob uses heterodyne detection and measures both
the qˆ and pˆ quadratures for obtaining (bq, bp). In this pro-
tocol, sifting is not needed, since both of the real random
variables generated by Alice are used for the generation
of the key. When the quantum communication is finished
and all the incoming quantum states have been measured
by Bob, classical post-processing including discretization,
parameter estimation, error correction, and privacy am-
plification over a public but authenticated classical chan-
nel is commenced to produce a shared secret key.
This Gaussian CV-QKD system in the prepare-and-
measure scheme can be represented by an equivalent
entanglement-based scheme [9, 10], where Alice gener-
ates a pure Gaussian entangled state, i.e., a two-mode
squeezed vacuum state ρAB with the quadrature vari-
ance V , where V = 1+χ
2
1−χ2 , and where χ = tanh(r), with
r being the two-mode squeezing parameter. Alice re-
tains mode A, while sending mode B to Bob. In the
entanglement-based scheme, if Alice applies a heterodyne
detection to mode A, she projects mode B onto a coher-
ent state. At the output of the channel, Bob applies a
heterodyne detection to the received mode. As a result
of Alice and Bob’s heterodyne detection on all the shared
entangled states, they end up with two sets of correlated
classical data as the raw key, from which they can extract
a shared secret key through the classical post-processing.
III. ASYMPTOTIC AND FINITE-SIZE
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the asymptotic regime the secret key rate in the re-
verse reconciliation scenario, where Bob is the reference
of reconciliation, is given byK = βI(a:b)−χ(b:E) against
Gaussian collective attacks, where I(a:b) is the maximum
3mutual information shared between Alice and Bob lim-
ited by the Shannon bound, χ(b:E) is the maximum mu-
tual information shared between Eve and Bob limited by
the Holevo bound, and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the reconciliation
efficiency. Note that in the asymptotic regime collective
attacks are as strong as coherent attacks [9, 10, 25]. Fur-
thermore, for Gaussian CV-QKD protocols, where the
key encoding is performed by a Gaussian modulation of
Gaussian states and the decoding is performed by Gaus-
sian measurement, i.e., homodyne or heterodyne detec-
tion, Gaussian attacks are asymptotically optimal among
collective attacks [26–28].
In the finite-size regime, the Gaussian no-switching
CV-QKD protocol acting on 2n coherent states sent from
Alice to Bob (or 2n two-mode squeezed vacuum states
in the equivalent entanglement-based scheme) is ǫ-secure
against Gaussian collective attacks in the reverse recon-
ciliation scenario if ǫ=2ǫsm+ǫ¯+ǫPE+ǫcor [29, 30] and if
the key length ℓ is chosen such that [29, 30]
ℓ≤N [βI(a:b)−χ(b:E)]−√N∆−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ), (1)
where [29, 30]
∆ = (d+1)2+4(d+1)
√
log2(2/ǫ
2
sm)+
2 log2(2/(ǫ
2ǫsm))+4ǫsmd/(ǫ
√
N),
(2)
and whereN=2n, d is the discretization parameter, ǫsm is
the smoothing parameter, and ǫcor and ǫPE are the max-
imum failure probabilities for the error correction and
parameter estimation, respectively.
The final key rate where the key is ǫ-secure against
Gaussian collective attacks is given by ℓ/N . Note that
in Eq. (1) we have considered the same scenario as [29],
where almost all the raw data can be utilized to distill the
secret key (by performing the parameter estimation after
the error correction1). However, if Alice and Bob are re-
quired to disclose a non-negligible number of data points
of size k, during the parameter estimation, a classical
data of size N ′ = N − k is used for the key extraction.
As a result, the final secure key rate is given by ℓ/N ,
where ℓ is given by Eq. (1), but now N in Eqs. (1) and
(2) has to be replaced by N ′.
Note that according to the approach introduced in
[32, 33], and numerically analysed in [34], in order to
analyse the composable finite-size security of the no-
switching CV-QKD protocol against coherent attacks,
the security of the protocol is first analysed against Gaus-
sian collective attacks with a security parameter ǫ [29],
and then by applying the Gaussian de Finetti reduction
[32] the security is obtained against coherent attacks with
1 It has also been shown in [31] that in CV-QKD the whole raw
keys can be used for both parameter estimation and secret key
generation, without compromising the security, and without any
requirements of doing error correction before parameter estima-
tion.
a polynomially larger security parameter ǫ˜ [32], where the
security loss due to the reduction from coherent attacks
to collective attacks scales like O(N4) [32].
IV. POST-SELECTION
A. Noiseless linear amplifier (quantum filter)
In contrast to classical optical channels, losses in quan-
tum channels cannot be compensated for by usual deter-
ministic phase-insensitive amplifiers, as the latter would
inevitably introduce additional noise [35], making the
quantum channel insecure. To avoid this noise penalty,
the idea of heralded noiseless linear amplifier (NLA) was
proposed in [18], which enables one to amplify probabilis-
tically the amplitude of a coherent state without adding
any extra noise. An NLA can be represented by the un-
bounded amplification operator gnˆ with the amplification
gain g > 1 and the photon number operator nˆ, which re-
alizes the following transformation on an input coherent
state |α〉 [18],
gnˆ |α〉 = exp
[
1
2
(g2 − 1)|α|2
]
|gα〉 . (3)
For a Gaussian CV-QKD system it has been shown that
the maximum transmission distance of the system can be
increased by applying an NLA on the received mode pre-
ceding Bob’s detection [19]. Explicitly, in the equivalent
entanglement-based scheme of the CV-QKD system Al-
ice prepares a pure two-mode Gaussian entangled state,
keeps one mode, while sending the second mode through
an insecure quantum channel to Bob, who applies an
NLA to noiselessly amplify the received mode, and dis-
till the entanglement. Since the amplification is prob-
abilistic, the successfully distilled entangled states are
then used in an ordinary deterministic CV-QKD proto-
col, where Alice and Bob apply Gaussian measurements
to their own shared modes.
An ideal NLA probabilistically converts a Gaussian
state into another Gaussian state. The NLA distills the
entanglement between Alice and Bob, hence effectively
converts the initial channel into another channel with
presumably higher associated performances. It has been
shown in [19] that for an entanglement-based scheme
with an initial pure entangled state with the two-mode
squeezing parameter of χ, and a quantum channel with
the transmissivity T and the excess noise ξ, the covari-
ance matrix of the output amplified state is equal to the
covariance matrix of an equivalent system with a two-
mode squeezing parameter χg, sent through a channel of
transmissivity Tg and excess noise ξg, without using the
4NLA. These effective parameters are given by [19]
χg = χ
√
(g2−1)(ξ−2)T−2
(g2−1)ξT−2
Tg =
g2T
(g2−1)T [ 14 (g2−1)(ξ−2)ξT−ξ+1]+1
ξg = ξ − 12 (g2 − 1)(ξ − 2)ξT.
(4)
These effective parameters can be interpreted as physical
parameters of an equivalent system if they satisfy the
constraints 0 ≤ χg < 1, 0 ≤ Tg ≤ 1, and ξg ≥ 0. Note
that the first condition of Eq. (4) is always satisfied if χ
is below a limit value [19]
0 ≤ χg < 1⇒ 0 ≤ χ <
(√
(g2 − 1)(ξ − 2)T − 2
(g2 − 1)ξT − 2
)−1
.
(5)
Recall that Eq. (4) can only be utilized to calculate the
covariance matrix of the output amplified state of an
NLA, when the NLA can be ideally implemented to pre-
serve the Gaussianity of the input state.
The improvement of the performance of Gaussian CV-
QKD systems using an ideal NLA has been discussed
for different protocols and in different scenarios [36–38].
However, in all of these works the success probability
has been considered based on the theoretical predictions
(which is much higher than the actual experimental suc-
cess probability). Also, the use of quantum scissors as
a practical candidate for an NLA has been investigated
in CV-QKD systems [39–42]. Note that all of these
works have focussed on the CV-QKD performance in the
asymptotic regime, which is an unrealistic scenario.
B. Measurement-based NLA (classical filter)
Since all optical implementations of NLA are extremely
challenging, the method of Gaussian post-selection or
measurement-based NLA was proposed [20, 21], and ex-
perimentally demonstrated [22], where the physical im-
plementation of an NLA can be emulated with a suitable
data processing. This represents a significant advantage
as the difficulty of sophisticated physical operations can
be moved from a hardware implementation to a soft-
ware implementation. In particular, it has been shown in
[21, 22], when an NLA directly precedes a heterodyne de-
tection, the NLA can be emulated by conditioning upon
the heterodyne measurement outcome via a classical fil-
ter function. This means that in the no-switching CV-
QKD system, the probabilistic noiseless amplification of
the received signal before Bob’s heterodyne detection can
be emulated by the probabilistic post-selection of Bob’s
heterodyne measurement data [21, 22].
Considering the input state of an NLA as ρin, the
Husimi Q-function of the amplified output state is given
by
Qout(α) =
1
π 〈α| gnˆρingnˆ |α〉 =
exp
[
(g2 − 1)|α|2
]
1
π 〈gα| ρin |gα〉 .
(6)
Performing a change of variable, αm = gα, we obtain
Qout(αm) = exp
[
(1 − 1g2 )|αm|2
]
1
π 〈αm| ρin |αm〉 . (7)
Having Eq. (7), we are able to determine the appropri-
ate classical post-selection filter to approximate an ideal
NLA prior to a heterodyne detection.
Let us assume in the entanglement-based representa-
tion of the no-switching CV-QKD protocol, Alice and
Bob share a mixed Gaussian entangled state ρAB (with
a zero mean and covariance matrixM = [aI2, cZ; cZ, bI2]
with I2 a 2×2 identity matrix, and Z = diag (1,−1)) be-
fore the detection. When Alice and Bob apply hetero-
dyne detection to their own modes, obtaining the mea-
surement values αm and βm respectively, the joint proba-
bility distribution of the measurement outcomes is given
byQin(αm, βm), which is in fact the Husimi Q-function of
the mixed Gaussian entangled state ρAB. Note that the
Husimi Q-function of a Gaussian two-mode state with a
zero mean and covariance matrixM can be expressed as
[21],
Qin(αm, βm) =
√
det(Γ)
π2 ×
exp
[
−a′|αm|2−b′|βm|2−2c′ |αm| |βm| cos(φα+φβ)
]
,
(8)
where Γ = [a′I2, c′Z; c′Z, b′I2] = 2(M + I4)−1 with
I4 a 4×4 identity matrix. Note that we have αm =
|αm| exp(iφα) and βm = |βm| exp(iφβ).
Post-selection in the CV-QKD protocol is performed
by filtering of the raw key (i.e., the measurement out-
comes) based on the value of the quadrature amplitudes
detected by Bob. In fact, Bob applies a probabilistic
filter to his measurement outcomes, βm, to realize the
pre-factor, exp
[
(1− 1g2 )|βm|
2
]
, in Eq. (7). Note that the
filter is truncated by a real cut-off parameter γc to make
the filter probability convergent. The filter function is
[21–23]
F (βm) =
{
exp
[
(1− 1g2 )
(
|βm|2 − γ2c
)]
, |βm| < γc
1, |βm| ≥ γc,
(9)
where βm = bq+ibp is constructed from Bob’s quadrature
measurement outcomes bq and bp, and the first piece of
F (βm) gives the acceptance probability, with which par-
ticular heterodyne measurement outcomes of Bob (out-
comes with magnitude less than γc) are kept, while the
others beyond the cut-off γc are kept with unity proba-
bility.
ConsideringNps as the number of accepted data points
which are kept by Bob, and N is the total number of data
5points before the post-selection, the success probability
of the post-selection is given by
Ps =
Nps
N =
∫ ∫
d2αm
∫ ∫
d2βm F (βm)Qin(αm, βm) =
2π∫
0
∞∫
0
dφαd |αm|
2π∫
0
γc∫
0
dφβd |βm| exp
[
(1− 1g2 )
(
|βm|2−γ2c
)]
×Qin(αm, βm) |αm| |βm|
+
2π∫
0
∞∫
0
dφαd |αm|
2π∫
0
∞∫
γc
dφβd |βm|Qin(αm, βm) |αm| |βm| ,
(10)
The final step to emulate an NLA is a linear rescaling on
Bob’s side that realizes βm = gβ. However, the rescal-
ing is only applied to Bob’s measurement outcomes with
magnitude less than γc, while the others beyond the cut-
off γc are kept unaffected. The final joint probability dis-
tribution of the measurement outcomes after the rescal-
ing is given by
Qout(α, β) =

g2
Ps
exp
[
(1− 1g2 )
(
|βm|2−γ2c
)]
Qin(αm, βm), |βm|<γc
1
Ps
Qin(αm, βm), |βm| ≥ γc,
(11)
where βm=gβ for |βm|<γc, and βm=β for |βm| ≥γc,
while Alice’s measurement outcomes do not need rescal-
ing, i.e., we always have αm=α.
Thus, in the post-selection, Bob first applies the fil-
ter function, exp
[
(1− 1g2 )
(
|βm|2 − γ2c
)]
, to his mea-
surement outcomes βm with magnitude less than γc, and
then rescales his filtered outcomes such that βm = gβ,
while his measurement outcomes beyond the cut-off γc
are kept unaffected with unit probability. In the CV-
QKD protocol with the post-selection, for each measure-
ment, Bob publicly reveals whether the outcome is kept
or rejected, in order for Alice to keep or discard her cor-
responding measurement outcome. The filtered raw key
of size Nps is then treated as if it was the original raw key,
which means the parameter estimation (to estimate the
covariance matrix,Mps, of the post-selected state shared
between Alice and Bob in the equivalent entanglement-
based scheme) should be performed on the post-selected
data.
Having the final probability distribution of the post-
selected data, Qout(α, β), we are able to calculate the
inferred covariance matrix of the amplified state before
the heterodyne detection in the equivalent quantum-filter
representation. The inferred covariance matrix Mps =
[apsI2, cpsZ; cpsZ, bpsI2] is given by
aps =
∫ ∫
d2α
∫ ∫
d2β ([2Re(α)]2 − 1)Qout(α, β),
bps =
∫ ∫
d2α
∫ ∫
d2β ([2Re(β)]2 − 1)Qout(α, β),
cps =
∫ ∫
d2α
∫ ∫
d2β (4Re(α)Re(β))Qout(α, β).
(12)
Note that in Eq. (12) only the second moment of Alice
and Bob’s quadratures has been calculated to compute
the elements of the covariance matrix of the amplified
state, since the first moment of Alice and Bob’s quadra-
tures remain zero after the post-selection.
C. Security analysis for the post-selection protocol
In the asymptotic security analysis of the CV-QKD
system with the post-selection (or the measurement-
based NLA), the computed key rate must be multiplied
by the success probability of the post-selection, Ps, of
Eq. (10). Explicitly, the asymptotic key rate of the post-
selection protocol which is secure against Gaussian col-
lective attacks in the reverse reconciliation scenario is
given by Kps = Ps[βIps(a:b)−χps(b:E)], where Ips(a:b) is
the classical mutual information between Alice and Bob
following the post-selection, and χps(b:E) is the Holevo
bound, i.e., the upper bound on Eve’s information on the
post-selected data (see Appendix A and Appendix B for
the key-rate calculation).
In the finite-size security analysis of the CV-QKD pro-
tocol with the post-selection, the size of the data con-
tributing to the secret key is no longer N . In fact, only
the accepted data of size Nps = PsN contributes to the
final post-selected key rate, hence, in order to compute
the finite-size key length, the number N must be replaced
by Nps. Explicitly, the finite-size key length of the post-
selection protocol which is secure against Gaussian collec-
tive attacks in the reverse reconciliation scenario is given
by
ℓps ≤ Nps[βIps(a:b)−χps(b:E)]−
√
Nps∆ps−2 log2( 12ǫ¯ ),
(13)
where ∆ps is calculated using Eq. (2) with N being re-
placed by Nps. Hence, the finite-size key rate of the post-
selection protocol is given by KFSps = ℓps/N or
KFSps ≤Ps[βIps(a:b)−χps(b:E)]−
√
Ps
N ∆ps− 2N log2( 12ǫ¯ ).
(14)
Note that in contrast to the asymptotic regime, the suc-
cess probability of the post-selection does not affect the
finite-size key rate as only a proportional factor. Note
also that in Eq. (13) we have again assumed almost
the whole raw key of size Nps after the post-selection
can be used for secret key generation. However, if the
data points of size k are disclosed after the post-selection
for the parameter estimation, a classical data of size
N ′ps = Nps − k is used for the key extraction. In this
case, the finite-size key rate is given by ℓps/N , where ℓps
is given by Eq. (13), but now Nps in Eq. (13) has to be
replaced by N ′ps.
6V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Gaussian post-selection
In the post-selection scheme, when the cut-off γc is cho-
sen sufficiently large such that the cut-off circle can em-
brace the amplified distribution, we can assume the dis-
tribution of the post-selected data remains statistically
Gaussian, and the post-selection approximates an ideal
NLA (which probabilistically converts a Gaussian state
into another Gaussian state) [21, 22]. Therefore, in the
CV-QKD protocol with the Gaussian post-selection, the
security can be analysed based on the equivalent scheme,
where the classical filter is replaced with a quantum fil-
ter (or NLA) before Bob’s heterodyne detection (as it
has been analysed in [21]), and the covariance matrix
of the amplified state shared between Alice and Bob in
the equivalent entanglement-based scheme can be cal-
culated using the covariance matrix of the equivalent
system with the effective parameters χg, Tg, ξg without
the post-selection. Note that the covariance matrix cal-
culated based on the effective parameters χg, Tg, ξg of
Eq. (4) is the same as the covariance matrix Mps of
Eq. (12) when the cut-off γc is chosen sufficiently large.
Now we numerically simulate the effect of the Gaus-
sian post-selection on the performance of the CV-QKD
protocol in the finite-size regime. In this work, we always
consider a lossy quantum channel with 0.2 dB losses per
kilometre, and the security parameter ǫ = 10−6. We con-
sider different values of block size, n = 1011 and n = 1012.
Note that the modulation variance (or the squeezing pa-
rameter χ in the equivalent entanglement-based scheme
) and the gain g are optimised to maximise the key rate.
We also choose a sufficiently large cut-off 2, γc = 3g
√
VB
(with VB the quadrature variance of Bob’s measurement
outcome before the detection and post-selection) to be
able to assume the post-selected state remains Gaussian.
In Fig. 1 the achievable secret key rate secure against
Gaussian collective attacks is shown as a function of chan-
nel distance (km) without the post-selection and with the
Gaussian post-selection for both the asymptotic and re-
alistic finite-size regime (n = 1011 and n = 1012), and for
the realistic reconciliation efficiency of β = 0.95 [43].
We can see from Fig. 1 that the Gaussian post-selection
(blue lines) can be useful when the protocol is operating
close to its limit, i.e., in the “water-fall” region of the
key-rate versus distance graph, where modest increases
in the correlation between Alice and Bob due to the
post-selection (or virtual amplification) can compensate
for the sacrificed raw key, allowing the recovery of a se-
cure key distribution from an initially insecure situation.
According to Fig. 1, the Gaussian post-selection is able
2 In our numerical simulations we found that by considering γc ≥
3g
√
VB [23], the covariance matrix of the amplified state, Mps,
calculated from Eq. (12) is the same as the covariance matrix
calculated based on the effective parameters χg, Tg, ξg of Eq. (4).
to effectively extend the maximum transmission distance
of the CV-QKD protocol in the unrealistic asymptotic
regime as it has been previously illustrated in [21, 22].
However, in the finite-size regime when the block size is
reduced, the improvement of the maximum transmission
distance due to the Gaussian post-selection decreases, be-
cause increases in the correlation cannot compensate for
the scarified raw key. In fact, in the finite-size regime,
the improvement of maximum transmission distance due
to the Gaussian post-selection can only appear when the
block size is sufficiently large (larger than n = 1011 for
the given parameters of Fig. 1), and the amount of such
an improvement increases with increasing the block size.
Note that in Fig. 1 we have considered a high-noise chan-
nel with ξ = 0.1. We have also performed a further nu-
merical simulation for a lower-noise channel with ξ = 0.05
(with the other parameters the same as Fig. 1). In this
case the maximum transmission distance of the protocol
is 137.7 km, which can be improved by the Gaussian post-
selection for the block sizes larger than n = 1015. Since
we are more interested in a realistic finite-size regime
with the block size in the range of n = 108 − 1012, we
will consider a higher-noise channel for the rest of our
numerical results.
Note that in Fig. 1, we have considered the cut-off as
γc = 3g
√
VB, so that 99.7% of the amplified distribution
lies within the cut-off circle [23], and we can assume the
post-selected data has a Gaussian distribution which can
emulate an ideal NLA. However, if we choose higher val-
ues for the cut-off, the post-selection provides a better
estimation of the NLA, at the expense of lower success
probability. As a result, a larger block size will be re-
quired for the CV-QKD performance to be improved by
the Gaussian post-selection.
B. Non-Gaussian post-selection
In the measurement-based NLA the choice of the fil-
ter cut-off, γc, is critical. Larger cut-off will improve the
approximation of the ideal NLA, however, a cut-off that
is too high will unnecessarily sacrifice raw data, and de-
crease the success probability. On the other hand, a cut-
off that is too low will increase the success probability, at
the expense of reducing the mutual information between
Alice and Bob. According to our numerical results for the
Gaussian post-selection, the success probability plays a
significant role in the finite-size security analysis, since
the success probability determines the size of data which
contributes to the post-selected key. In this section we
investigate whether a reduction of the post-selection cut-
off (which will increase the success probability) improves
the post-selection performance in the finite-size regime.
When the fiter cut-off decreases from γc = 3g
√
VB , the
statistics of the post-selected data start changing from
Gaussian to non-Gaussian. However, based on the opti-
mality of Gaussian attacks [26–28], for all bipartite quan-
tum states ρAB with covariance matrix MAB, one can
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FIG. 1. The achievable secret key rate from reverse reconcilia-
tion as a function of channel distance (km) in the no-switching
CV-QKD protocol over a lossy channel with ξ = 0.1 and with
0.2 dB losses per km, without the post-selection (red lines)
and with the Gaussian post-selection, where γc = 3g
√
VB
(blue lines) for the asymptotic and finite-size regime (n = 1011
and n = 1012) with the discretization parameter of d = 5 and
β = 0.95. The modulation variance (or the squeezing pa-
rameter χ) and the gain g are optimised to maximise the key
rate.
maximise Eve’s information by considering ρGAB, which
is the Gaussian state having the same covariance ma-
trix MAB. Hence, in order to analyse the security of
the protocol in the non-Gaussian regime, we only require
to calculate the covariance matrix of the non-Gaussian
amplified state. Note that when the post-selection is in
the non-Gaussian regime, we cannot use Eq. (4) any-
more to calculate the covariance matrix of the amplified
state. Instead, we have to use the Q-function of the post-
selected state, i.e., Eq. (12) to calculate the covariance
matrix of the amplified state, and compute a lower bound
on the post-selected key rate. Note also that the tech-
nique of the measurement-based NLA with an entangled-
state input has always been investigated in the Gaussian
regime, where the filter cut-off is sufficiently large [21, 22].
However, here we investigate the characterization of the
measurement-based NLA with an entangled-state input
in the non-Gaussian regime by decreasing the filter cut-
off, and the impact this cut-off reduction can have on the
related CV-QKD performance.
Let us consider a quantum channel equivalent with an
optical fiber of 43 km, which according to Fig. 1, is almost
the maximum transmission distance of the CV-QKD sys-
tem with the optimised Gaussian post-selection, where
we have the excess noise of ξ = 0.1, β = 0.95, and the
block size of n = 1012. For this channel the optimized
Gaussian post-selection (with γc = 3g
√
VB) generates the
finite-size key rate ofKFSps = 3.4×10−6 (bits per symbol).
0 1 2 3 4 5
c
5.8
6
6.2
a
ps
0 1 2 3 4 5
c
1.7
1.75
1.8
1.85
b p
s
0 1 2 3 4 5
c
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
c p
s
0 1 2 3 4 5
c
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
I p
s(a
:b)
0 1 2 3 4 5
c
0.4
0.42
0.44
0.46
ps
(b:
E)
FIG. 2. The elements of the covariance matrix, Mps, of
the post-selected state, (i.e., aps, bps, and cps), the classi-
cal mutual information between Alice and Bob, Ips(a:b), and
Eve’s information from reverse reconciliation (i.e., the Holevo
bound), χps(b:E) as a function of the filter cutoff γc for a
quantum channel equivalent with an optical fiber of 43 km,
ξ = 0.1, β = 0.95, χ = 0.8379, g = 1.1 and the block size of
n = 1012.
For this quantum channel we now investigate the effects
a decrease in the post-selection cut-off, γc, can have on
the CV-QKD performance.
In Fig. 2, the three top plots show the elements of the
covariance matrix, Mps, of the amplified state (i.e., aps,
bps, and cps in Eq. (12)) as a function of the post-selection
cut-off γc. As it can be seen, for γc ≥ 3g
√
VB = 4.26,
the post-selected state can be assumed to be Gaussian,
as the elements of the covariance matrix Mps remain al-
most constant and equal to the covariance matrix ele-
ments of the amplified state resulted from an ideal NLA
(calculated based on Eq. (4)). We can see the covari-
ance matrix elements of the amplified state decrease as
the cut-off is reduced. As a result, the classical mutual
information between Alice and Bob, Ips(a:b), as well as
Eve’s information, i.e., the Holevo bound, χps(b:E) (with
both being calculated based on the covariance matrix
Mps) decrease with the cut-off reducing (shown in the
two bottom plots of Fig. 2). Although the raw key-rate
term, βIps(a:b)−χps(b:E), also drops with the decrease in
the cut-off, the success probability of the post-selection,
Ps, exponentially increases with the cut-off decreasing
according to the left plot of Fig. 3. As a result, both the
asymptotic and finite-size key rates first increase with the
cut-off decreasing up to an optimized value, and then de-
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FIG. 3. The post-selection success probability, Ps, and the
finite-size and asymptotic key rate from reverse reconciliation
as a function of the filter cutoff γc for a quantum channel and
the protocol with the same parameters as Fig. 2.
crease until they disappear (see Fig. 3, right plot). There-
fore, our results show that there is an optimal value for
the cut-off in the non-Gaussian regime which maximizes
the key rate. According to Fig. 3, the finite-size key rate
can be improved up toKFSps = 4.3×10−5 (i.e., an improve-
ment of more than one order of magnitude) by decreas-
ing the cut-off from Gaussian regime to non-Gaussian
regime, i.e., from γc = 3g
√
VB = 4.26 to γc = 3.4. Note
that in Figs. 2 and 3, for γc ≥ 3g
√
VB , the post-selected
state remains almost Gaussian and the post-selection can
emulate the ideal NLA, while γc = 0 corresponding to no
post-selection.
Note that the lower bound on the key rate which
we calculate for the post-selection in the non-Gaussian
regime is not tight, and it could likely be improved
using the numerical approach of [44]. The bound is
loose because it relies on Gaussian optimality proof [26–
28], which means that χps(b:E) is computed for the
Gaussian state with the same covariance matrix as the
non-Gaussian amplified state, and χps(b:E) is therefore
overestimated. Techniques that provide tighter bounds
for non-Gaussian statistics would therefore result in a
smaller value for the optimal cut-off which, given the ex-
ponential improvement in the fraction of data kept, could
significantly improve the key rates.
Now we repeat our numerical simulations for the post-
selection in Fig. 1, with a lower cut-off, γc = 2.5g
√
VB,
and compute the post-selected finite-size key rate, with
the results shown in Fig. 4. We can see that decreasing
the cut-off from γc = 3g
√
VB to γc = 2.5g
√
VB has a pos-
itive impact on the CV-QKD performance, including the
improvement of the finite-size key rate by up to an order
of magnitude at the maximum transmission distance of
the protocol, as well as the extension of the transmis-
sion distance up to a half kilometre. We can see that
for n = 1012 by decreasing the cut-off from γc = 3g
√
VB
to γc = 2.5g
√
VB the improvement of the transmission
distance due to the post-selection becomes more signifi-
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FIG. 4. The achievable secret key rate from reverse reconcili-
ation as a function of channel distance (km) in the CV-QKD
protocol over a lossy channel with ξ = 0.1 and with 0.2 dB
losses per km, without post-selection (red lines), with the
Gaussian post-selection, i.e., γc = 3g
√
VB (blue lines), and
with the non-Gaussian post-selection, i.e., choosing a lower
cut-off γc = 2.5g
√
VB (black lines) for the finite-size regime
(n = 1011 and n = 1012) with β = 0.95.
cant. Furthermore, we can see that while for n = 1011
there is no improvement in the transmission distance due
to the post-selection with γc = 3g
√
VB, the transmis-
sion distance can be improved by decreasing the cut-off
to γc = 2.5g
√
VB. Recall again that here in our nu-
merical simulations for γc = 2.5g
√
VB the post-selected
state is not Gaussian (although it is close to the Gaussian
regime), hence we use the output Q-function, Qout(α,β),
to calculate the elements of the covariance matrix of the
post-selected state, Mps. Our results show the impor-
tance of the proper choice of the post-selection cut-off in
the CV-QKD system.
Additional calculations beyond those illustrated here
have been carried out covering direct reconciliation,
which results in similar trends to those indicated here.
However, direct reconciliation is only successful when the
channel loss is below 3 dB. In the direct reconciliation,
Eve’s information should be calculated based on the mu-
tual information between Alice and Eve, i.e., χps(a:E).
For the numerical simulations of the direct reconciliation
see Appendix C.
C. Parameter estimation in the post-selection
protocol
Note that the no-switching CV-QKD protocol is exper-
imentally implemented in the prepare-and-measure (PM)
scheme, where for the post-selection the classical filter is
applied on Bob’s heterodyne detection results, while for
9the security analysis we need to know the covariance ma-
trix,Mps, of the amplified (or post-selected) state shared
between Alice and Bob in the equivalent entanglement-
based (EB) scheme.
In the case of Gaussian post-selection, we can consider
a normal linear model for Alice and Bob’s post-selected
variables in the PM scheme, xPMps and y
PM
ps , respectively
as yPMps = tgx
PM
ps + zps, where tg =
√
Tg
2 , and zps fol-
lows a centred normal distribution with unknown vari-
ance σ2g = 1+
1
2Tgξg (note that Alice’s variable x
PM
ps has
the variance V gA). The maximum-likelihood estimators
for the effective parameters, tg, σ
2
g , and V
g
A are given by
[45, 46]
tˆg =
∑k
i=1 xiyi∑k
i=1 x
2
i
,
σˆ2g =
1
k
∑k
i=1 (yi − tˆgxi)
2
,
Vˆ gA =
1
k
∑k
i=1 x
2
i ,
(15)
with the uncertainty in the effective parameters ex-
pressed as [45, 46]
∆(tg) = zǫPE/2
√
σˆ2g∑k
i=1 x
2
i
,
∆(σ2g) = zǫPE/2
σˆ2g
√
2√
k
,
∆(V gA) = zǫPE/2
Vˆ gA
√
2√
k
(16)
where xi and yi are the realizations of x
PM
ps and y
PM
ps , re-
spectively, and k is the number of data points randomly
chosen from the post-selected data for the parameter es-
timation 3. As a result, the covariance matrix , Mps,
of the amplified state shared between Alice and Bob in
the EB scheme, which maximises Eve’s information [45]
is given by Mˆps = [aˆpsI2, cˆpsZ; cˆpsZ, bˆpsI2], where
aˆps = V
g
A,max+1,
bˆps = 2(t
2
g,minV
g
A,max+σ
2
g,max)−1,
cˆps =
√
2 tg,min
√
V gA,max
2
+2V gA,max,
(17)
and where
tg,min = tˆg −∆(tg)
σ2g,max = σˆ
2
g +∆(σ
2
g),
V gA,max = Vˆ
g
A +∆(V
g
A).
(18)
3 Note that zǫPE/2 is such that 1− erf(
zǫPE/2√
2
)/2 = ǫPE/2.
However, in the case of non-Gaussian post-selection,
the relation between the cross-correlation term, cps, of
the covariance matrix Mps in the EB scheme is not di-
rectly related to the cross-correlation term of the data
observed by Alice and Bob in the PM scheme, i.e.,
1
k
∑k
i=1 xiyi. Hence, instead of calculating Mps from the
data observed in the PM scheme, Alice and Bob can
first reconstruct the equivalent data in the EB scheme
based on the whole data from the PM scheme preced-
ing the post-selection. Considering Alice and Bob’s vari-
ables in the PM scheme preceding the post-selection as
xPM and yPM, Alice and Bob’s variables in the equiv-
alent EB scheme preceding the post-selection would be
xEB =
√
VA+2√
2VA
xPM and yEB = yPM, with VA is the ini-
tial modulation variance in the PM scheme preceding the
post-selection. Next, Bob applies the classical filter on
his data and publicly reveals whether the data is kept or
rejected. Finally, Alice and Bob perform parameter esti-
mation over a randomly-chosen subset (of size k) of their
post-selected data, xEBps as y
EB
ps , to directly estimateMps
via 1k
∑k
i=1 x
′
i
2
, 1k
∑k
i=1 y
′
i
2
, and 1k
∑k
i=1 x
′
iy
′
i, where x
′
i
and y′i are the realizations of x
EB
ps and y
EB
ps , respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have investigated the impact post-
selection or measurement-based NLA can have on the
CV-QKD performance (when it is applied on the mea-
surement outcome of Bob’s detection) in the finite-size
regime. We found that the post-selection can extend the
maximum transmission distance of CV-QKD protocol in
the finite-size regime providing the finite block size is suf-
ficiently large. For finite blocks with a practical length,
we found that the post-selection is effective for the pro-
tocols with high values of excess noise. Further, we anal-
ysed the performance of the measurement-based NLA on
the entangled-state input in the non-Gaussian regime by
decreasing the post-selection cut-off, thereby illustrating
that there is an optimal value for the post-selection cut-
off that optimises the CV-QKD performance in terms of
both the finite key rate and transmission range.
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Appendix A: Calculation of mutual information and
Holevo bound
In the entanglement-based scheme of the no-switching
CV-QKD protocol, Alice generates a pure two-mode
Gaussian entangled state, i.e., a two-mode squeezed vac-
uum state with the quadrature variance V . Alice keeps
the first mode and transmits the second mode through a
quantum channel with transmissivity T and excess noise
ξ. The covariance matrix of the mixed state ρAB at the
output of the channel before the detection is given by
M =
[
V I2
√
T
√
V 2 − 1Z√
T
√
V 2 − 1Z (T (V + χline)) I2
]
, (A1)
where χline = ξ +
1
T − 1. Having the covariance matrix
M, we are able to compute the Q-function, Qin(αm, βm),
of the state shared between Alice and Bob preceding the
post-selection using Eq. (8). Then, following Eq. (10)
and Eq. (11) we can compute the post-selection success
probability Ps as well as the Q-function, Qout(α, β), of
the post-selected state, from which we can compute the
inferred covariance matrix, Mps, of the amplified state
using Eq. (12).
Following the post-selection, the mutual information
between Alice and Bob, Ips(a:b), can be calculated as
(see Appendix B for the actual mutual information)
Ips(a:b) = log2
aps + 1
aps + 1− c
2
ps
bps+1
. (A2)
In the collective attack, the Holevo mutual informa-
tion χ(b:E) is given by χ(b:E) = S(ρE)−S(ρE|b), where
S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of the state ρ. Note
that S(ρE) is given by the von Neumann entropy of the
amplified state, which can be calculated through the sym-
plectic eigenvalues λ1,2 of covariance matrix Mps
4. The
second entropy S(ρE|b) is given by the von Neumann
entropy of Alice’s state conditioned on Bob’s detection,
which can be calculated through the symplectic eigen-
value of the covariance matrix of the conditional state
MA|b = Aps−Cps (Bps+I2)−1 CTps, where Aps = apsI2,
Bps = bpsI2, and Cps = cpsZ.
Appendix B: Actual mutual information
In the case of Gaussian post-selection, when the post-
selected state has Gaussian statistics, the actual mutual
information between Alice and Bob can be calculated
using the covariance matrix, Mps, of the amplified (or
4 The von Neumann entropy of an n-mode Gaussian state ρ with
the covariance matrix M is given by S(ρ) =
∑n
i=1 G(
λi−1
2
),
where λi are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
M, and G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2(x).
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FIG. 5. The classical mutual information between Alice and
Bob following the post-selection, Ips(a:b), using the covari-
ance matrix, Mps, of the amplified state via Eq. (A2) (solid
line), and using the Q-function of the post-selected state via
Eq. (B1) (dashed line), as a function of the filter cutoff γc for
a quantum channel equivalent with an optical fiber of 43 km,
ξ = 0.1, χ = 0.8379, g = 1.1.
3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8
Distance [km]
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
K
ey
 R
at
e
Without Post-selection
Gaussian Post-selection
Post-selection with a lower cutoff
FIG. 6. The achievable secret key rate from direct reconcili-
ation as a function of channel distance (km) in the CV-QKD
protocol over a lossy channel with ξ = 0.1 and with 0.2 dB
losses per km, without post-selection (red lines), with the
Gaussian post-selection, i.e., γc = 3g
√
VB (blue lines), and
with the non-Gaussian post-selection, i.e., choosing a lower
cut-off γc = 2g
√
VB (black lines) for the finite-size regime
(n = 1010) with β = 0.95.
post-selected) state via Eq. (A2). However, in the case
of non-Gaussian post-selection, when the post-selected
state has non-Gaussian statistics, the actual mutual in-
11
formation can be calculated using
Ips(a:b) = Hps(a) +Hps(b)−Hps(a, b), (B1)
where Hps(a) is the Shannon entropy of Alice’s classical
variable (or Alice’s heterodyne-measurement result in the
entanglement-based scheme) following the post-selection,
Hps(b) is the Shannon entropy of Bob’s heterodyne-
measurement result following the post-selection, and
Hps(a, b) is the joint entropy of Alice and Bob’s clas-
sical variables following the post-selection. In Eq. (B1),
Hps(a, b) is calculated as
Hps(a, b) = −
∫ ∫
d2α
∫ ∫
d2β Qout(α, β) log2[Qout(α, β)]
(B2)
where Qout(α, β) is the Q-function of the post-selected
state given by Eq. (11). In Eq. (B1), Hps(b) is calculated
as
Hps(b) = −
∫ ∫
d2β Qout(β) log2[Qout(β)] (B3)
where Qout(β) is the Q-function of Bob’s post-selected
state, given by
Qout(β) =
∫ ∫
d2α Qout(α, β). (B4)
In Eq. (B1), Hps(a) is calculated as
Hps(a) = −
∫ ∫
d2α Qout(α) log2[Qout(α)] (B5)
where Qout(α) is the Q-function of Alice’s post-selected
state, given by
Qout(α) =
∫ ∫
d2β Qout(α, β). (B6)
Note that while we can have analytical forms for
Qout(α, β) and Qout(β), from which we can calculate
Hps(a, b) and Hps(b) using Eqs. (B2) and (B3), respec-
tively, no closed-form solution for Qout(α) could be used,
so Eqs. (B5) and (B6) should be numerically determined.
Now, we calculate the mutual information between
Alice and Bob for the parameters of Fig. 2 using two
approaches; first using the covariance matrix, Mps, of
the amplified (or post-selected) state via Eq. (A2), and
also using the Q-function of the post-selected state via
Eq. (B1), with the results shown in Fig. 5. Note that
for the numerical integration of Eqs. (B5) and (B6), we
divide the integration interval intom = 1000 equal subin-
tervals. As can be seen from Fig. 5, there is a very
small gap between Ips(a:b) calculated using the two ap-
proaches. More precisely, for γc < 3, the mutual in-
formation calculated using the covariance matrix, i.e.,
Eq. (A2) is less than that calculated using the output
Q-function, i.e., Eq. (B1), while for γc > 3, the mutual
information calculated from Eq. (A2) is higher than that
calculated from Eq. (B1). Note that by increasing the
number of sub-intervals, the numerical integration be-
comes more precise, and the gap becomes smaller. Note
also that since the gap between Ips(a:b) calculated using
the two approaches is very small (less than 0.8 % even
for m = 1000), for our numerical simulation we have cal-
culated Ips(a:b) using the covariance matrix,Mps, of the
amplified state via Eq. (A2).
Appendix C: Post-selection in the direct
reconciliation scenario
Here, we show the effectiveness of the post-selection in
the finite-size regime for the direct reconciliation. Fig. 6
shows the achievable secret key rate secure against Gaus-
sian collective attacks in the direct reconciliation sce-
nario as a function of channel distance without the post-
selection, and with the Gaussian post-selection (where
the cut-off is sufficiently large, i.e., γc = 3g
√
VB) in the
finite-size regime. We found if the block size is suffi-
ciently large, here larger than n = 1010, the transmis-
sion range of the direct reconciliation scheme can be im-
proved by the post-selection, with the improvement in-
creases with increasing the block size. Now, by keeping
the block size fixed, we decrease the post-selection cut-off
to γc = 2g
√
VB , where the post-selected data has a non-
Gaussian statistics. As it can be seen, this non-Gaussian
post-selection is more effective than the Gaussian post-
selection, increasing the transmission range from 3.7 km
to 4.7 km.
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